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By Billy Kluttz 
Summary 
The Supreme Court case, Loving v. Virginia (1967) legalized interracial mar-
riage. More recently, the state of California allowed for the citizens to vote for or 
against same sex marriage. The author discusses the recent California state’s de-
cisions for or against same sex marriage and how often it hinges upon the jus-
tice’s interpretation of Loving v. Virginia (1967) and whether it can be applied to 
same sex marriage arguments.  
 
Introduction  
 
On May 15th, 2008, the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling In re Marriage Cases (Ca. 2008) 
declared the denial of marriage rights to same 
sex couples to be unconstitutional in the state of 
California. Soon thereafter, on November 4th, 
2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, a 
Constitutional revision defining marriage as a 
union only between a 
man and a woman. As 
the ever increasing 
number of cases over 
same sex marriage is 
heard in America’s 
court system, there is 
one constant argument– 
the holding’s reliance 
on the Loving analogy. Decisions for or against 
same sex marriage often hinge upon the justice 
interpretation of Loving v. Virginia (1967) and 
whether it can be applied to same sex marriage 
arguments. In my paper, I argue that Loving v. 
Virginia does indeed make laws restricting mar-
riage to opposite sex couples only, unconstitu-
tional. The struggles for same sex marriage and 
interracial marriage are very similar. Both ar-
guments emerge from the belief that the free-
dom to marry the person of one’s choosing is an 
inherent right and is confined by the equal 
protection and due process clauses under 
the 14th Amendment. The cases that most 
recently legalized same sex marriage in 
America, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public 
Health (Mass. 2003) and In re Marriage 
Cases, cited the connections of same sex 
marriage to the interracial 
marriage struggle and the 
Loving case.  Although 
many opponents say the 
issues in Loving and same 
sex marriage cases are not 
related because of Loving’s 
racial context; closer 
analysis shows their shared 
goal – the ability to choose one’s spouse 
without government intervention. 
 
Loving v. Virginia 
 
Before we examine the Loving analogy, 
we must first outline Loving v. Virginia 
itself. In June of 1958, Mildred Jeter, an 
African American woman, and Richard 
Loving, a white male, were married in the 
District of Columbia, where interracial 
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marriages were legal. After their marriage, the 
Lovings returned to Virginia. They were con-
victed of breaking Virginia’s anti-miscegenation 
statute: however, the trial judge suspended the 
sentence for 25 years if the Lovings promised to 
leave Virginia. The trial judge, Leon Bazile, jus-
tified his holding, “Almighty God created the 
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and 
he placed them on separate continents. And but 
for the interference with his arrangement there 
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact 
that he separated the races shows that he did not 
intend for the races to mix." (Loving 3) 
The Lovings moved to the District of Colum-
bia and appealed the earlier court decision to the 
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled 
that although anti-miscegenation laws may be 
equally enforced upon African Americans and 
Caucasian Americans, there original intention 
was mere racial discrimination. Furthermore, 
Chief Justice Warren ruled that denying the 
Lovings the right to marry because of their dif-
fering races violated their liberty right without 
due process as defined under the 14th Amend-
ment’s due process clause. In his opinion, War-
ren states:  
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on 
so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifica-
tions embodied in these statutes, classifications 
so directly subversive of the principle of equal-
ity at the heart of the 14th  Amendment, is 
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of lib-
erty without due  process of law. (p12) 
Although Warren’s intent may seem rather 
explicit, since his ruling, the broader implica-
tions and applications of his words have contin-
ued to be argued throughout America’s courts. 
 
Loving Analogy 
 
But what is the “Loving analogy”? Arguments 
made using the Loving analogy claim that just as 
the Equal Protection and Due Process clause un-
der the 14th Amendment protect interracial mar-
riage, in the same way, such statutes should 
protect same sex couples’ rights to marriage. 
Law professor Lynn Wardle and lawyer 
Lincoln Oliphant claim there are several 
“garnishes” to the Loving analogy. These 
garnishes include comparing the suffering of 
racial minorities and gays, racism with ho-
mophobia, the social/legal discrimination 
against mixed race and same sex couples, 
the religious views used to justify racism 
and homophobia, and the general minority 
status of African Americans and gays. Al-
though they use these “garnishes” to mock 
and discredit the Loving analogy, I think 
their observations of the various ways the 
case is utilized are important to acknowl-
edge (Wardle, 2007).  The NAACP’s Legal 
Defense and Educational fund released the 
following statement utilizing one such “gar-
nish”: 
 
The basic principles applied in Loving should 
be applied to any state effort to deny any per-
son the right to marry the person he or she 
loves. It is undeniable that the experience of 
African Americans differs in many important 
ways from that of gay men and lesbians; the 
legacy of slavery and segregation is profound. 
But differences in historical experiences 
should not preclude the application of consti-
tutional provisions to gay men and lesbians 
who are denied the right to marry the person 
of their choice. (Wolfson, 2007, p187) 
 
In his piece promoting the Loving analogy, 
noted attorney and gay rights activist, Evan 
Wolfson cites the above quotation from the 
NAACP. He also cites the following per-
sonal statement Mildred Loving released on 
June 12, 2007, about the application of the 
Loving case for same sex marriage argu-
ments: 
 
I am still not a political person, but I am 
glad that Richard’s and my name is on a 
court case that can help reinforce the love, 
the commitment, the fairness, and the family 
that so many people, black or white, young 
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or old, gay or straight seek in life. I support the 
freedom to marry for all. That’s what Loving, and 
loving, are all about. (Wolfson, 2007, p192) 
 
Wolfson includes both quotes to emphasize the 
support of the Loving analogy by the broader 
African American community, a point that 
needs emphasizing since many opponents to 
such analogies deny its support by other minor-
ity groups and cite the overwhelming racial mi-
nority support for anti-gay legislation such as 
Proposition 8.  In the larger argument for same 
sex and interracial marriage parallels, some 
have begun to use the earlier California Su-
preme Court case Perez v. Sharp (1948), which 
banned anti-miscegenation laws in California, to 
clarify the nature of marriage rights at stake in 
Loving v. Virginia. Loving labels marriage as a 
“basic human right of man”, but focuses on the 
racist subtext behind anti-miscegenation laws.  
Perez engages race and its social construction 
and shows the need to marry a “person of one’s 
choice”.  By emphasizing choice and self-
expression, Perez shows the ways that anti-
miscegenation laws serve to shape societal 
norms surrounding gender and race and vali-
dates the usage of the Loving analogy (Lenhardt, 
2008). 
 
Baehr v. Lewin: First Successful Court 
Case 
 
The first court case to successfully make the 
Loving analogy between interracial and same 
sex marriage was Baehr v. Lewin (Hawaii, 
1993). In Baehr, two lesbian couples and one 
gay couple filed against John Lewin, the head of 
Hawaii’s Department of Health, for refusing 
them marriage licenses. Although the court did 
not rule that same sex couples had a fundamen-
tal right to marriage, they did see the denial of 
marriage licenses to same sex couples as sex 
discrimination. The court cites Loving in its 
opinion and expounds upon the two cases his-
torical connections, “we do not believe that trial 
judges are the ultimate authorities on Divine 
Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, con-
stitutional law may mandate, like it or not, 
that customs change with an evolving so-
cial order.” (570)  
In response to the court’s holding, Ha-
waii passed Amendment two to its State 
Constitution that explicitly defined mar-
riage as a union between one man and one 
woman—much like the current Proposi-
tion 8 in California.  Although the plain-
tiffs in Baehr were never issued the mar-
riage licenses for which they had filed, the 
Baehr case will be remembered as the first 
case to rule in favor of same sex marriages 
and as a milestone in the gay rights 
movement (Gregory, 2007).  
 
Recent Court Cases that Legalized 
Same Sex Marriage 
 
The two American cases that most re-
cently legalized same sex marriage, Good-
ridge v. Department of Public Health and 
In re Marriage Cases, both drew upon 
Loving and similar based rationales. In 
Goodridge, Justice Margaret Marshall 
ruled in support of same sex marriage be-
cause she felt such restrictions were dis-
criminatory, “The Massachusetts Constitu-
tion affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals. It forbids the creation of sec-
ond-class citizens (312).” Marshall later 
references the Loving analogy directly: 
 
For decades, indeed centuries, in much of 
this country … no lawful marriage was pos-
sible between white and black Americans. 
That long history availed … [when] the 
United States Supreme Court held that a 
statutory bar to interracial marriage violated 
the 14th Amendment, Loving v. Virginia. 
As … Loving make[s] clear, the right to 
marry means little if it does not include the 
right to marry the person of one's choice. 
(327) 
 
Similarly, Chief Justice of the California 
Supreme Court, Ronald George cited past 
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discrimination against interracial couples in his 
ruling on In re Marriage Cases:  
 
Although the understanding of marriage as limited 
to a union of a man and a woman is undeniably the 
predominant one, if we have learned anything 
from the significant evolution in the prevailing so-
cietal views and official policies toward members 
of minority races and toward women over the past 
half-century, it is that even the most familiar and 
generally accepted of social practices and tradi-
tions often mask an unfairness and inequality that 
frequently is not recognized or appreciated by 
those not directly harmed by those practices or tra-
ditions (853-54). 
 
Some may object that I have misrepresented 
Justice George’s opinion on the Loving analogy, 
and I concede that he never directly affirms the 
Loving analogy. He even negates it being used 
to argue sex discrimination. However, I feel his 
overall comparison of the same sex marriage 
struggle to past treatment of other minorities 
allows for the inclusion of his opinion in an arti-
cle discussing the Loving analogy and similar 
arguments.  
Many have argued against the Loving analogy 
because it was called into question and defeated 
just four years after the original Loving ruling. 
In Baker v. Nelson (1971), two men asked a 
Minnesota clerk for a marriage license, but were 
deprived of it. They argued that Loving entitled 
them to a marriage license because denying 
same sex marriage is another form of “invidious 
discrimination”. The court ruled that traditional 
marriage laws are constitutional and that Loving 
applied only to racial discrimination. Yet upon 
closer inspection, one can see the discriminatory 
undertones of Justice Peterson’s opinion. Peter-
son reveals his heavily antiquated definitions of 
family and marriage in his opinion, “the institu-
tion of marriage as a union of man and woman, 
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing 
of children within a family, is as old as the book 
of Genesis (312).”   
The court eventually ruled that one only has a 
right to marry someone of the opposite sex, cit-
ing social tradition and procreation. It is 
clear from Peterson’s argument that he 
does not see sexual orientation as an in-
trinsic quality. In fact, Peterson never uses 
the word “sexual orientation” in his state-
ment. Chief Justice Taney saw no wrong 
in his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(1857) that African Americans could never 
become American citizens; similarly Jus-
tice Peterson is blind to his own prejudice 
and uses tradition to justify continued dis-
crimination. Randall Kennedy, a Harvard 
Law Professor, discussed such prejudice in 
his 1997 article “Loving at Thirty.”  He 
claims that overtime people will become 
less adverse to plights for same sex mar-
riage, “Just as many people once found 
trans-racial marriage to be a loathsome 
potentiality well-worth prohibiting, so, 
too, do many people find same-sex mar-
riage to be an abomination. This fright-
ened, reflexive reaction will likely dissi-
pate in many of the same way that antipa-
thy to the idea of trans-racial marriage has 
dissipated.” As such discrimination dissi-
pates; a case similar to Baker can be revis-
ited in the near future without such bias 
from Justices (Kennedy, 1997). In the 
same way reactionary backlashes to pro-
gay marriage rulings, such as Proposition 
8 in California and Proposition 2 in Ha-
waii will lessen as generic intolerance in 
society diminishes. Until then, gay mar-
riage advocates must wait and cling to the 
grounding of their argument—equality.  
 
Inherent Injustice 
 
Loving v. Virginia legalized interracial 
marriages because of an inherent injustice. 
The same laws that protect interracial cou-
ples’ right to marry must be applied to 
same sex couples. As society progresses 
towards full acceptance of gay and lesbian 
couples, we must look to the past for a 
roadmap to overcoming discrimination 
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and intolerance. Through understanding cases 
such as Loving that signaled the end of other 
eras of discrimination, we can learn how to 
overcome current discrimination, “that’s what 
Loving, and loving, is all about.” (Wolfson, 
2007,192).  
Kennedy, Randall. "Loving v. Virginia at 
Thirty." 16 Feb 1997. 6 Oct 2008 
<http://www.speakout.com/activism/opi
nions/3208-1.html>. 
Lenhardt, R.A. "Beyond Analogy: Perez 
v.Sharp,Anti-Miscegenation Law, and 
the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage." Cali-
fornia Law Review 96 (2008): 844-846.   
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